This paper investigates how combining positions between the board of directors and topmanagement affects bank profitability. We use 2010 bank-level data from 112 countries. Our results suggest that combining positions reduces both ROE and ROA of banks. However, for banks in developing countries, the influence proves to be positive. We also show that the higher the proportion of the board members who simultaneously hold a managerial position, the lower the profitability of the bank. This effect is observed both for developed and developing countries.
Introduction
Bank governance involves a set of decisions by which managers and executives can influence both the current soundness and profitability of the financial institution and the longterm prospects of its development. The efficiency of managerial decisions depends not only on the competence of employees who implement them, but also on the hierarchy of responsibilitymeaning, on corporate governance system -arranged in the bank.
Corporate governance is commonly understood as the theory and practice of relations between owners and managers of a corporation. Thus, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , "Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment" (p. 737). Monks and Minow (1995) also define corporate governance as "the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations" (p. 8).
Actually, the phenomenon of corporate governance is closely related to the concept of ownership and management separation. The concept appeared in application to large corporations where it is almost impossible for numerous shareholders to make strategically important decisions in coordination. The decision-making process became more consistent as experienced and properly educated managers were involved in corporation governance.
However, in addition to benefits, separating ownership and control has a significant drawback:
The pursuit of various interests by managers and owners engenders the agency problem. Instead of maximizing shareholder returns, managers may strive to increase the volumes of sales in the pursuit of bonuses in the current period, even if such a solution leads to a decrease in company profits or impedes achieving long-term goals. In other words, shareholders who act as "principals" may face a loss of wealth due to the fact that "agents" (managers), in the pursuit of higher wages and reputation, may stand for extremely risky or unprofitable decisions. In order to not lose potential benefits, the shareholders have to control the management's actions, meaning that the company owners are responsible for agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
In practice, the separation of owner and manager interests can be interpreted in terms of the interaction and division of powers between the Board of Directors, which may be considered as representative of shareholder interests, and the executives or top management. Although the powers of the directors may vary among companies, overall responsibilities usually include strategy development, control over its performance, and deciding the payment of dividends to shareholders. Managers are those who are responsible for the quality of the strategy implementation and day-to-day operations. However, the separation of powers among representatives of these groups is not always obvious.
Corporate governance efficiency in banks falls short of thorough examination in the empirical literature as the majority of studies devoted to the structure of the Board of Directors exclude financial firms from the sample, concentrating only on non-financial companies.
However, just as in the studies dedicated to the non-financial sector, analysis of the peculiarities of corporate governance in the banking industry is conducted to clarify how the individual characteristics of managers and structural features of the Board of Directors affect bank operations.
The problem of efficient distribution of powers in banks among the directors and executives on different levels is currently attracting much attention from both regulators and Here we try to answer the question of how combining positions within the Board of Directors and Management affects a bank's profitability. This combination means that a member of the Board of Directors, who takes strategically important decisions, is also responsible for their execution. On the one hand, the combination of positions helps to avoid misunderstanding tasks and reduces the need for the quality of implementation monitoring. On the other hand, combining positions results in a situation when it becomes more profitable for a director to act in accordance with the management's interests, and not that of the owners. For instance, a director that is also a manager can vote for solutions that increase his own wealth and have the authority to implement such decisions -in other words, have not only the motives, but also the tools to defend his own interests.
It should be noted that the process of electing board members in a company is influenced by internal factors (Articles of Incorporation, the experience of past years, tradition established in the company) and external factors (legislation). Therefore, the practice of choosing and appointing candidates for board positions may differ much from company to company. Usually, however, directors are appointed after the company's owners cast their votes, when the owners propose candidates to the Board. For example, in Russia, the right to nominate a candidate for a post as a board member is legislatively fixed for shareholders owning more than 2% of the company. Shareholders may propose candidates attracted from the outside, a company's employees, or set up themselves as candidates.
In order to determine the impact that combining the positions has on the bank's profitability, we estimate the effect from the presence of directors that also hold manager positions in a bank. We also assess the impact of the share of such directors in the total number of board members. We use data from the Bankscope database on commercial banks from 112 countries in 2010.
Revealing the effect of combining positions on the Board of Directors and bank management may be useful in making decisions about bank regulation both in the framework of the Articles of Incorporation and at the legislative level. In fact, such corporate governance aspects as the responsibilities of managers and the associated limitations, the system of director voting, and disclosure requirements regarding the board's composition may be regulated at the legislative level, the regulation differ between countries. The composition of the Board of Directors, its remuneration scheme, and the rules for the selection of directors and other characteristics of corporate governance are commonly prescribed in the Articles of Incorporation. In drawing up the Articles of Incorporation, commercial banks can focus on the recommendations for corporate governance, published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This study may contribute to these recommendations with respect to the efficiency of the positions separation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the related literature, Section III contains a description of the sample and outlines the methodology we use. Section IV presents the results, and Section V concludes.
Literature
The combination of key positions is studied quite extensively for non-financial companies. In analyzing the possible impact of combining the positions of CEO and Chairman of 6 the company's operations, in addition to agency problems, Finkelstein and Avenida (1994) consider "organizational theory", according to which it is easier for a company with a single leader to accomplish better management decisions than if the decision is to be made by a number of leaders. Using return on assets as a measure of efficiency, the authors confirm the In this paper we investigate a phenomena that is broader than combining only the positions of Board Chairman and CEO. We study how a bank's profitability may be affected by combining positions between the Board of Directors and management -the two governing bodies of a bank. In terms of agency problems, the threat from combining the positions of Chairman and CEO is that managers strive to pursue their own interests while also serving as a Board member. In fact, the Chairman does not make decisions alone, whereas the CEO is not the only one responsible for the quality of strategy implementation. Therefore, consideration of the compatibility between governing bodies helps to understand the possibility that a bank's activity is affected by the implementation of management's interests through seats on the Board.
Data and Methodology
We use data from the Bankscope database, which contains information on different characteristics of banks from numerous countries. We analyze data on commercial banks from 112 countries for the year 2010. The banks for which there is no information on the Board of Directors were excluded from the sample. We also excluded observations with values of key financial indicators that do not correspond to common sense.
We also use a number of macroeconomic indicators that were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. The final sample size contains 1118 observations.
We estimate the following model (OLS, errors were clustered by countries): We use two indicators of bank profitability: Return on equity (ROE) and Return on assets (ROA). Return on assets characterizes the efficiency of bank managers, reflecting the volume of profit generated by the unit of assets. Return on equity shows shareholder return, reflecting the profit per unit of capital invested.
We evaluate the impact of combining managerial positions in two steps. At the first step we assess the effect of the presence of managers on the Board of directors. At the second step we estimate the impact of the share of directors who also hold managerial position in the total number of the Board members. We expect that combining these positions negatively affects a bank's profitability. This negative influence can be explained by the fact that when combining positions on the Board and in management, a director becomes interested in defending solutions that improve the welfare of managers, even if they do not correspond to shareholder interests; as a member of the Board of Directors, a manager receives a greater capacity to act in the interests of management. For example, such managers may promote ineffective projects in order to enhance their own reputation, and they may also refuse potentially profitable projects in an effort to relieve the working day or pursue financial indicators that allow them to get the highest salary bonus. Such actions may potentially lead to a decrease in net income, and hence profitability.
Thus, the negative effect might be explained by agency problems within the organizational structure of a bank. A greater number of directors simultaneously holding managerial positions make the Board more interested in increasing the welfare of bank management. Most decisions of the Board are taken on the grounds of voting results, and thus a greater number of directors who also serve as managers favors the interests of management. Therefore, we expect that an increase in number of directors who hold managerial positions will result in lower profitability.
We also take into account the influence of key bank characteristics, specifically its size and the quality of its assets. Larger banks can more effectively allocate risks and during crises the government may support large banks in correspondence with the "too-big-to-fail" hypothesis.
Therefore, we expect a positive influence of bank size on profitability. The natural logarithm of bank assets was used as a proxy for size (ln_tassets). The ratio of bank deposits to assets (dep_tassets) characterizes a bank's capacity to perform credit operations. The greater the volume of deposits attracted by the bank, the more opportunities the bank has for profit.
Therefore, we suggest that the effect will be positive (Allen, Carletti, Marquez, 2011; Berger, Kick, Schaeck, 2012). The scale of credit activity of the bank is captured by the ratio of bank loans to total assets (net_loans_tassets). As a control variable, we also use the capital adequacy ratio (total_capratio), which is a measure of bank reliability. Financial stability increases the We also aim to determine whether there are any differences in the impact that combining positions has on bank profitability in emerging countries compared with those in developed ones.
Indeed, most emerging countries are characterized by immature corporate governance systems.
As suggested by Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012), the efficiency of corporate governance is usually associated with such institutional characteristics as the strength of legal rights, protection of ownership rights, the level of corruption, requirements for information disclosure, and transparency of the corporate governance system. A higher value of each indicator corresponds to a more mature system of corporate governance. Emerging economies tend to lag behind developed countries on each of these indicators (see Table 1 , which compares the abovementioned indicators for some developed and emerging countries). In this paper we focus on a list of countries based on the S&P 4 index (sp). We evaluate the peculiarities of the influence that combining managerial positions has on profitability in emerging countries using the variable sp_leg_exe. 
The Effect of Combining Positions
We begin the analysis by examining the impact of combining positions on profitability.
In other words, the independent variable under consideration is a binary variable that equals one for banks that have managers on the Board of Directors. Our first-step estimations show that combining positions on the Board of Directors and in management negatively influences a bank's profitability both in terms of return on assets and return on equity.
The return on equity of a bank is lower in case a combination of positions takes place.
The effect is of economic significance -the size of the effect is 4-7 p.p. -and is quite stable in various model specifications (see Table 3 ). Thus, in terms of shareholder profitability, a separation of powers between the Board of Directors and management is efficient. However, this conclusion is valid only for developed economies. For banks in emerging countries (according to the classification of S&P) there is an overlapping positive effect from the combination of positions (columns 2-4 in Table 3 ). The net impact in absolute terms is close to zero. Such an impact indicates that in these countries combining positions may be used if it is necessary for business processes and losses in profitability will not occur. The positive effect can be explained by the fact that for emerging countries a reduction of costs for monitoring management leads to growth in profitability for shareholders: In case of combining the posts of a director and a manager, the one who sets goals is also responsible for their implementation, and hence the combination helps to avoid misunderstandings between managers and directors and to reduce the need for the monitoring of a manager's performance. One of the possible explanations as to why this effect is observed across emerging markets is that in emerging economies corporate governance systems are at an early stage of development. Thus, lacking necessary experience, knowledge, and management practices may result in a less efficient separation of management and control. In case of an insufficient experience in the separation of powers between the Board and management, the delegation of authority may be less productive than a "do-it-yourself" strategy.
The impact of control variables does not always correspond to what is expected. As we assumed, a higher capital adequacy ratio positively affects the return on equity, while the level of risk decreases it. Note, however, that in both cases, the effects of size are much lower than the indices of corporate governance. However, the higher value of loans to assets adversely affects the return on equity, whereas the size of the bank and its ability to attract deposits turned out to be insignificant. -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) gdp_percap -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 Banks listed on the stock exchanges were more profitable, however, the effects of differences in the principles of combining the positions are the same for them and for unlisted banks, i.e. the pressure of the market in this case does not reveal itself.
Country specific variables are significant in all model specifications. Higher GDP per capita and lower inflation reduce the profitability of the banking business, however, the value of both effects are quite low.
Next we analyze the influence of the positions combination on the return on assets.
Evidence suggests that the effect is again negative, however, the size of this effect is very low and does not exceed 0.6 p.p. (see Table 4 ). Overlapping effect for emerging economies at this stage is not observed. Thus, as regards return on assets the positions combination is not efficient.
of provisions for loans, we document the negative significant impact of the ratio of deposits to assets on profitability. Thus, decrease of the deposit-credit activity results into higher return on assets.
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The Influence of the Scale of Positions Combination
At the next stage, we study the impact that the scale of combining positions and the share of board members that are also managers in the total number of board members have on the profitability of banks. Again we start with the analysis of the effects on the return on equity (see Table 5 ). The data show that the higher the proportion of members on the Board of Directors who combine their position with that position of manager, the lower the return on equity is.
Again, the effect is economically significant, as share growth profitability decreases by 5-7 percent for every for 1 p.p. We again document the overlapping effect for emerging economies, but the net effect remains negative and accounts for 1-2 p.p. Therefore, the negative impact of combining managerial positions is softened, but does not disappear. The significance of the signs and the absolute values of other variables are preserved, which testifies to the stability of the results previously obtained. We also observe the negative effect from combining leadership positions within a bank for a model where the dependent variable is return on assets. The greater the share of Board member who also holds managerial positions, the lower the profitability. However, in absolute terms, the effect is much lower than for ROE (see Table 6 ).
The abovementioned overlapping effect for developing countries in these model specifications is absent: The variable characterizing the effect of combining emerging markets proved to be insignificant (see Table 6 ). 
Emerging Markets
The analysis revealed some differences in the impact that the separation of powers has on profitability among developed and emerging countries. For banks in emerging countries, we identified an overlapping positive effect of combining positions on return on equity; total impact in absolute terms was close to zero. The overlapping effect for emerging economies was also documented while studying the impact that the scale of combining programs has on the return on equity. At this stage of analysis, the negative impact of combining managerial positions is softened, but does not disappear.
To check for the stability of these differences, we estimate the model for banks from emerging countries only. The banks of developed economies were excluded from the sample and the model was tested again.
Evidence suggests that the effect of combining positions is not significant for emerging economies (see Table 7 ). Such a result indicates that in these countries combining positions has no influence on business processes. We then estimated the impact that the scale of combining positions has on return on equity. For two model specifications, we observe the negative effect from the combination of leadership positions on return on equity (see Table 8 ).
Therefore, even though a negative impact is not documented for all four specifications, we may conclude that these results are consistent with those derived from the first part of the analysis. 
Conclusion
The Basel Committee has been discussing the expediency of regulating corporate governance in the banking sector for more than 10 years already. Special attention is paid to the 20 issue of combining the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. The results of this study highlight the need for a broader approach to regulating the spheres of director responsibility, namely the need to restrict the combination not only of the Board Chairman and CEO, but also of positions between the Board of Directors and bank management.
The evidence from 112 countries show that the presence of managers in the Board of Directors has a negative impact on bank profitability, both in terms of profitability for managers (ROA) and return for shareholders (ROE). However, such a conclusion proved to be true only for developed economies. For banks in emerging countries, we identified the overlapping positive effect of combining positions. The total impact in absolute terms was close to zero, which indicates that in these countries combining positions may be used with no loss in profitability, if it is required by business processes.
We have also shown that the greater the proportion of directors that also hold managerial posts in the total number of Board members, the lower a bank's profitability is. The overlapping effect of emerging economies remained for ROE, but the net effect is negative. However, a larger number of Board members who also hold managerial positions have a negative impact on profitability to a lesser extent for banks in emerging countries than for those in developed ones.
A similar effect for emerging countries can be explained by the fact that, at this stage in emerging economies, the system of corporate governance is in the initial stages of development, including a lack of necessary experience, knowledge, and management practices, which does not allow one to effectively separate management and control. In this case, a "do-it-yourself" strategy proves to be more productive than a control delegation in terms of profit. Therefore, separating management and control does not increase profitability and, in some cases, even reduces it.
